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On the Constitutionality of the Independent Counsel
Provisions of the Ethics in Government Act: Do
They Comport with the Separation of Powers?
The independent counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government
Act' have come under attack by the Reagan administration 2 and by
persons who have been investigated or prosecuted by independent
counsels.' It is possible that these important provisions, intended to
prevent conflicts of interest by the Justice Department in investigating
high government officials, 4 will be declared unconstitutional by the
United States Supreme Court.'

1. 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-98 (1982 Supp. III 1985), as amended by the Independent
, 56
Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-191, 101 Stat.
U.S.L.W. 39 (Dec. 15, 1987).
2. Prior to the passage of the Reauthorization Act, supra note 1, the Reagan
administration took the position that the independent counsel provisions of the
Ethics in Government Act should not be reenacted. Werner, Justice Dept. Says
Prosecutor Law Should be Vetoed, N.Y. Times, June 17, 1987, § 1 at 1, col. 4.
The administration has also filed a brief in a court case taking the position that the
Act is unconstitutional. Shenon, U.S. Challenges Special Counsel Law, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 1, 1987 § 1 at 10, col. 4. See also In Re Olson, 818 F.2d 34 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
3. See North v. Walsh, 656 F. Supp. 414 (D.D.C. 1987) and a related case,
In re Sealed Case, 829 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, No. 87-869 (Jan. 19,
1988), infra notes 109-117 and accompanying text. See also Deaver v. Seymour, 656
F. Supp. 900 (D.D.C. 1987), aff'd. 822 F.2d 66 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Because Colonel
Oliver North had not been indicted, his challenge to the independent counsel
provisions was found to be premature and was dismissed. North v. Walsh, 656 F.
Supp. 414. Later, Colonel North appealed a contempt order resulting from his
refusal to comply with a grand jury subpoena. North challenged the independent
counsel's authority to preside over the grand jury. 829 F.2d at 51. The court never
reached the question of the constitutionality of the independent counsel provisions.
Instead, it held that the Attorney General's regulations appointing the counsel were
sufficient to establish his authority. 829 F.2d at 62. See infra notes 109-117 and
accompanying text. Michael Deaver's challenge to the independent counsel provisions
was simply held to be unripe. Deaver, 656 F. Supp. 900. A challenge to the
constitutionality of the Act by certain former Justice Department officials was
upheld in In re Sealed Case, Nos. 87-5261, 87-5264, 87-5265 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 22,
1988) (available Feb. 22, 1988, on LExIS, Genfed Library, Dist. file), prob. juris.
noted, sub nom. Morrison v. Olson, No. 87-1279 (Feb. 22, 1988) [hereinafter 1988
Sealed Case]. See infra notes 120-25, 153-193 and accompanying text.
4. On the intent of Congress in enacting the Ethics in Government Act, see
S. Rep. No. 170, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-7, reprinted in, 1978 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News 4216, 4217-23.
5. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia recently
declared the independent counsel provisions unconstitutional. See supra note 3.
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The need for the independent counsel is evident. The events of the
Watergate scandal made it apparent to Congress that the Justice
Department cannot be expected to impartially investigate high government officials. 6 Congress concluded that it was necessary to create
a means by which an impartial, independent officer could investigate
where politics might hamper the Justice Department. Recent events
have shown the wisdom of that conclusion. The Iran-Contra affair 7
and the Deaver and Nofziger affairs,' because of their political
implications, could not have been effectively investigated by persons
under the President's control. What is even more apparent is that
the Justice Department could have never effectively investigated
Attorney General Edwin Meese 9 or its own former officials. 10
This comment will discuss the constitutionality of the independent
counsel provision, a matter on which the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has recently ruled."
This comment will also analyze the Act itself, the arguments for and
against its constitutionality and the impact of recent United States
Supreme Court cases. In addition, this piece will discuss the courts'
handling of the Act to date.
Given the recent strict interpretations of the separation of powers
doctrine, it is by no means obvious that the independent counsel
provision will survive a constitutional challenge in the United States
Supreme Court. It is hoped that this comment will show why the

6. See supra note 4.
7. Members of the President's National Security Council, including Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North, have been accused of illegally selling arms to Iran and
diverting the proceeds to the Contras, a group attempting to overthrow the Nicaraguan government. Some of the proceeds of the arms sale are unaccounted for.
This affair and attempts to cover it up were the subject of Senate hearings. See
generally N.Y. Times, July 8-Aug. 1, 1987.
8. Michael Deaver, a close friend of President Reagan, was recently convicted
of perjury for lying to Congress about influence-peddling activities. Franklin, Deaver
Found Guilty of Lying 3,Times Under Oath, N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 1987, §1 at 1,
col. 2. Lyn Nofziger, a former presidential aide, was found guilty of impermissibly
lobbying the White House on behalf of various organizations. Johnston, Nofziger
Is Convicted on 3 Counts of Violating Federal Ethics Law, N.Y. Times, Feb. 12,
1988, §1 at 1, col. 2.
9. Attorney General Edwin Meese has been investigated by independent
counsels on several occasions. Gerth, ProsecutorStudying Actions of Meese While
in the Cabinet, N.Y. Times, Oct. 16, 1987, §1 at 1, col. 1; Legal Life Jacket for
Mr. Meese, N.Y. Times, May 13, 1987, §1 at 26, col. 1.
10. See 1988 Sealed Case, supra note 3. See infra notes 120-25, 153-193 and
accompanying text.
11. 1988 Sealed Case, supra note 3. The court held that the independent

counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government Act were unconstitutional.
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independent counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government Act
comport with the appointments clause of the Constitution 2 and with
the separation of powers doctrine of Bowsher v. Synar 3 and INS v.
Chadha.14

I. A DIscussIoN OF THE ACT'S PROVISIONS
The independent counsel provisions, originally enacted as the special prosecutor provisions in 1978,15 were part of the congressional
response to the Watergate scandal.' 6 There had been scandals prior
to the Nixon administration, some of which were not well investigated.' 7 However, only during the Nixon administration were there
12.

U.S. CONST. art. II, §2, cl. 2. See infra, note 37, for the text of the

appointments clause.
13. 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986). See infra notes 91-95 and accompanying text.
14. 462 U.S. 919 (1983). See infra notes 83-89 and accompanying text.
15. Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1867 (1978). Significant amendments to the
special prosecutor provisions of the Ethics in Government Act were enacted in 1982.
See S. Rep. No. 496, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-19, reprinted in, 1982 U.S. Code Cong.
& Ad. News 3537, 3540-3555. [hereinafter Senate Report No. 496]. There were also
1987 amendments. See supra note 1.
16. See Senate Report No. 496, supra note 15, at 3537-38. See also S. Rep.
No. 170, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-4, reprinted in, 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News
4216, 4217-20.
The connection between the Ethics in Government Act and the Watergate scandal
is discussed in Kramer & Smith, The Special Prosecutor Act: Proposalsfor 1983,
66 MiNN. L. REv. 963 (1982) [hereinafter Kramer & Smith]; Note, Fallen Angels,
Separation of Powers, and the Saturday Night Massacre: An Examination of the
Practical, Constitutional, and Political Tension in the Special ProsecutorProvisions
of the Ethics in Government Act, 49 BROOKLYN L. REv. 113 (1982) [hereinafter
Brooklyn Note]. Tiefer, The Constitutionalityof Independent Officers as Checks on
Abuses of Executive Power, 63 B.U.L. REV. 59 (1983) [hereinafter Tiefer].
17. Financial and influence peddling scandals are an old problem. They
plagued the administrations of Presidents Grant, Harding, Truman, Eisenhower and
Johnson. See Brooklyn Note, supra note 16, at 116 and In re Olson, 818 F.2d 34
(D.C. Cir. 1987).
The most serious of these were the Teapot Dome scandal during the Harding
administration and a scandal involving the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) during
the Truman administration. The Teapot Dome scandal, which involved illegal leases
of naval oil reserves, resulted in the imprisonment of the Secretary of the Interior
and the indictment of the Attorney General. It may have resulted in the impeachment
of President Harding had he not died in office. Brooklyn Note, supra note 16, at
116.
The Truman administration scandal, which involved corrupt handling of tax evasion
cases, resulted in the firings or forced resignations of over 150 IRS agents, plus the
forced resignations of the Assistant Attorney General of the Tax Division and an
Assistant Commissioner of Internal Revenue. The investigator appointed to look
into this corruption was fired by the Attorney General because of the rigor with
which the investigation was pursued. The Attorney General was then fired by
President Truman. 818 F.2d at 40-41.
Despite these scandals, the power to investigate and prosecute remained in the Justice
Department and under the President's control.
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conflicts of interest in the Justice Department and actions by the
President to impede investigations 8 which prompted Congress to act
on the need for a prosecutor independent of the President. It was
apparent to Congress that an impartial investigator, not controlled
by the President, was needed to revive the public's confidence in the
government.' 9 After considering various measures over a period of
five years, 20 Congress settled on the special prosecutor provisions
(later renamed independent counsel provisions) of the Ethics in
Government Act of 1978.
The Ethics in Government Act 2 provides for the appointment of
an independent counsel by a special division of the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. 22 If the United
States Attorney General (Attorney General) receives information re-

18. The Watergate scandal was a sorry affair which began in 1972 with the
burglary of the Democratic National Committee headquarters by agents of Nixon's
reelection campaign. It ended with the convictions of high officials of the Nixon
administration and the resignation of the President in 1974. See Brooklyn Note,
supra note 16, at 116.
Two situations in particular made apparent the need for a special prosecutor who
is independent of the President. The first of these was the firing of Special Prosecutor
Archibald Cox. Because he did not wish to turn over his own tapes and notes,
President Nixon ordered the removal of Mr. Cox. Rather than remove the Watergate
investigator, Attorney General Elliot Richardson resigned. Deputy Attorney General
Ruckelshaus was dismissed for his refusal to remove Mr. Cox. Finally, Acting
Attorney General Robert Bork removed Mr. Cox. This series of events, know as
the "Saturday Night Massacre," had a direct connection to the eventual enactment
of the special prosecutor provisions. Brooklyn Note, supra note 16, at 117-118. See
also S. Rep. No. 170, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3, reprinted in, 1978 U.S. Code Cong.
& Ad. News 4216, 4218-19; In re Olson, 818 F.2d at 41-42.
The second, and possibly more serious situation was the pervasive corruption of the
Justice Department during the Nixon administration. It has been shown that the
Justice Department staff conveyed information concerning the ongoing Watergate
investigation to President Nixon and presidential counsel John Dean. In addition,
there were FBI wiretaps of journalists and government officials not supporting the
President; possible settlement of antitrust cases by the Justice Department in return
for campaign contributions; and other misuses of information and investigative
powers. See Simon, The Constitutionality of the Special Prosecutor Law, 16 U.
MicH. J.L. Ref. 45, 48-50 (1982) [hereinafter Simon].
Perhaps it was the pervasiveness of conflicts of interest in the Nixon administration
Justice Department which caused Congress to conclude that a prosecutor who was
independent of the President was needed.
19. S. Rep. No. 496, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in, 1982 U.S.Code
Cong. & Ad. News 3537.
20. On the extensive history of the special prosecutor provision (later independent counsel provisions), see Kramer & Smith, supra note 16, at 964-66; Brooklyn
Note, supra note 16, at 118 n.27 and 126 n.62.
21. See supra note 1.
22. 28 U.S.C. § 593, 28 U.S.C. § 49.
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garding a federal criminal violation by someone covered by the Act, 23
and the information is sufficiently specific and credible, 24 the Attorney
General must conduct a preliminary investigation. If the Attorney
General determines that further investigation is warranted, or does
not find it unwarranted within ninety days of the start of the
preliminary investigation, he or she can then apply to the special
25
division of the court for the appointment of an independent counsel.
The Attorney General's decision to apply for such appointment, or
26
not to apply, is nonreviewable.
23. 28 U.S.C. § 591. Those covered by the Act are the President and Vice
President; high officials of the Executive Office of the President and the Justice
Department; the Director and Deputy Director of Central Intelligence; the Commissioner of Internal Revenue; high officials in the President's campaign organization; and certain other high officials. Id.
This list of covered officials is smaller than in the list in the original 1978 Ethics in
Government Act. Although the 1982 Amendments narrowed the scope of the Act's
mandatory coverage, a "catch-all" provision was added to the Act which can result
in coverage of other persons whose investigation by the Justice Department could
lead to a conflict of interest. Use of an independent counsel in such cases is at the
discretion of the Attorney General. S. Rep. No. 498, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-11,
reprinted in, 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 3537, 3542-47 [hereinafter 1982
Senate Report].
The "catch-all" provision was added in part because of the "Billygate affair," in
which an allegedly improper relationship between President Carter's brother and the
government of Libya was investigated. Prior to the 1982 Amendments, an independent counsel could not be appointed in such a situation. In addition, Congress
deemed that the Attorney General should have broad discretion to investigate
conflicts of interest through the use of the independent counsel mechanism. Id. at
3544-46.
On the then-proposed 1982 amendments in general, see Kramer & Smith, supra note
16, at 983-97.
24. 28 U.S.C. § 592(a)(1). Prior to the 1982 amendments, the Attorney,
General had to investigate allegations of criminal wrongdoing upon receipt of
"specific information," even if that information was not provided by a credible
source. Congress considered this to be unworkable due to the potential for the waste
of time and money and the unfairness to persons accused if the need for an
investigation was determined not to exist. 1982 Senate Report, supra note 23, 334749.
25. 28 U.S.C. § 592.
26. See 28 U.S.C. § 592(0. The statute provides that the Attorney General's
decision to apply for appointment of an independent counsel is not reviewable. Id.
The statute has been interpreted to preclude review of an Attorney General's decision
not to apply for appointment of an independent counsel, as well. See Banzhaf v.
Smith, 737 F.2d 1167 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Dellums v. Smith, 797 F.2d 817 (9th Cir.
1986); Nathan v. Smith, 737 F.2d 1069, 1077-1082 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J.
concurring) (individuals were held to have no standing to challenge an Attorney
General's refusal to appoint a special prosecutor [now independent counsel]). For a
discussion of the Banzhaf case, see Comment, Banzhaf v. Smith: Judicial Review
Under the Independent Counsel Provisions of the Ethics in Government Act, 70
IOWA L. REv. 1339 (1985).
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The court sets forth the jurisdiction of an independent counsel. 27
Although limited, this jurisdiction is exclusive;28 all Justice Department investigations within the counsel's jurisdiction must cease. The
counsel has broad powers and considerable independence. 29 Removal
must be for good cause and only by the Attorney General.3 0 The
independent counsel's position is temporary, lasting only until all
investigations and prosecutions within his or her jurisdiction are

complete, or until the court decides to terminate

it.31

Although the Ethics in Government Act provides that an independent counsel must be appointed by a court and insulated from
the Department of Justice, this does not mean that the Attorney
General has no prosecutorial discretion. There can be no investigation
or prosecution by an independent counsel until the Attorney General
decides that one should be appointed. In addition, the Attorney
General has some control over the removal of an independent counsel.
Even though an independent counsel is insulated from executive
branch control while investigations and prosecutions are in progress,
the Attorney General's power under the Act should not be under-

estimated.
II.

CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES

Because the independent counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government Act 32 involve judicial appointment of an executive branch
officer, and because that officer is given independence from the
President,33 the constitutionality of this statute has been questioned.
27.
28.
29.

28 U.S.C. § 593(b).
28 U.S.C. §§ 593(a) and 597.
28 U.S.C. § 594(a).

30. The Ethics in Government Act provides that the Attorney General may
personally remove an independent counsel only for good cause or incapacity. 28
U.S.C. § 596(a)(1). Prior to the 1987 amendments, the Act provided for judicial
review of such removal by the same special division of the court which appointed
the counsel. 28 U.S.C. § 596 (a)(2). The 1987 amendments to the Act provide for
review of the Attorney General's removal of the counsel by the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia. See Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act
of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-191, 101 Stat.
, 56 U.S.L.W. 39, 42 at § 596(a)(3)
(December 15, 1987).
31. 28 U.S.C. § 596(b).
32. 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-98.
33. The "good cause" requirement for removal grants an independent counsel
some freedom from pressure by either the President or other executive branch
officers. The impact of this protection is heightened by the requirement of a report
to Congress on removal and by the reviewability of removal. See 28 U.S.C. § 596
and supra note 30.
The requirement of suspension of Justice Department investigations of matters
assigned to the independent counsel also insulates the independent counsel from the
executive branch. See 28 U.S.C. § 597.
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Doubts were raised in Congress when an independent prosecution
mechanism was first considered3 4 and these doubts continued to
surface over the next several years.3 5 During the Reagan administration, the constitutionality of the independent counsel provisions has
been challenged repeatedly. Generally, the questions as to constitutionality involve the appointment of the independent counsel under
the appointments clause;3 6 restrictions on removal; separation of
powers questions surrounding interference with the prosecution function of the executive branch; and the role of the courts in the
independent counsel scheme.
III.

THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF JUDICIAL APPOINTMENT UNDER
THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE

The appointments clause mandates that certain important government officials must be nominated by the President and confirmed
by the Senate. However, the clause also states that "Congress may
by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think
proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads
of Departments. ' 3 7 The constitutionality of the appointment of an
independent counsel by a court depends upon whether an independent
counsel is such an "inferior Officer."
Those who would invalidate judicial appointment of an independent counsel38 point to Buckley v. Valeo39 as standing for the propo-

34. See, e.g., Special Prosecutor: Hearings Before the Senate Committee on
the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), particularly the article by Dean Roger
C. Cramton of the Cornell University Law School, at 34-37 and the Staff Memorandum at 37-40.
35. See, e.g., Watergate Reorganization and Reform Act of1975: Hearings
on S.495 and S.2036 Before the Senate Comm. on Government Operations, 94th
Cong. 1st Sess. Part 2 47, 54-55 (1975 & 1976) (statement of Harold R. Tyler,
Deputy Attorney General, discussed in Kramer & Smith, supra note 14, at 965).
-36. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. See infra note 37, for the text of the
appointments clause.
37. Id. The full text of the appointments clause is set forth below:
[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of
the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls,
Judges of the Supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States,
whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall
be established by Law; but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment
of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the
Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.
Id.
38. See, e.g., plaintiff's brief in Kraft v. Gallinghouse, Civ. A. No. 80-2952
(D.D.C. filed Nov. 19, 1980) at 11-12, reprinted in, Special ProsecutorProvisions
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sition that the counsel is not an inferior officer. It has been argued
that the independent counsel, wielding all the powers of the Justice
Department, must be seen as an important government officer subject
to the nomination and confirmation process."°
This argument ignores the true nature of the independent counsel's
position. While the counsel has broad powers and great independence 4 he or she may investigate and prosecute only within the
42
narrow area set forth by the court, and only for a limited time.
Such a single-purpose prosecutor is far different from the Federal
Election Commissioners involved in Buckley 43 who were to serve for
a longer time and who had broad powers similar to those of an
independent agency.
More than the statute overturned in Buckley, the independent
counsel provisions resemble a statutory scheme upheld in United
States v. Eaton" in 1898. In that case, the emergency appointment

of Ethics in Government Act of 1978: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Oversight
of Government Management of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 97th
Cong. 1st Sess. 294, 306-7 (1981) [hereinafter plaintiff's brief in Kraft]. (Kraft
involved a Carter administration official who was investigated by a special prosecutor
for the use of cocaine. It was dismissed when the investigation ended with no
indictment.)
39. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). The case involved the 1974 amendments to the Federal
Election Campaign Act of 1971, 2 U.S.C. § 431 et seq. and 18 U.S.C. § 591 et
seq. Much of this voluminous case involved the unconstitutionality of certain
campaign spending restrictions, which were held to violate the first amendment. 424
U.S. 1.
The appointment mechanism for members of the Federal Election Commission, an
executive agency, was also overturned. The Court held that Congress could not
appoint members of the Commission, as the appointments clause does not allow
for congressional appointment of officers of the United States. Because of their
substantial powers, the Federal Election Commissioners were held not be inferior
officers. Id. at 140-43.
For discussion of Buckley, see Kramer & Smith, supra note 16, at 975-78.
40. See plaintiff's brief in Kraft, supra note 38, at 306-07.
41. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
42. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 593(b), 596(b). For a discussion of the limitations on
the independent counsel's powers, see also Simon, supra note 18, at 60-61.
43. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
44. 169 U.S. 331 (1898). In this case, the Minister resident and consul-general
to Siam became too ill to fulfill his duties and had to return to the United States.
At the time, a vice-consul who had been appointed was in the United States. The
consul appointed an emergency vice-consul in accordance with a statute and regulations then in effect, to perform the consul's duties until the other vice-consul
arrived. There was a controversy over whether the emergency vice-consul to Siam
was constitutionally appointed. The Supreme Court upheld the appointment of the
emergency vice-consul because of the temporary nature-of the position and the need
for an immediate appointment. Id.
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of a vice-consul was upheld by the United States Supreme Court,
45
although the vice-consul wielded all the powers of the consul.
Despite the requirement that a consul be nominated by the President
and confirmed by the Senate,46 the vice-consul was held to be an
inferior officer because his appointment was temporary.47 The emergency vice-consul, who wielded the powers of a superior officer
temporarily, can be compared to an independent counsel. The counsel
wields the powers of the Attorney General, but within a limited
sphere and for a short time.
Eaton supports the argument that only a few officers must be
nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate. In fact,
the appointments clause has been construed to require nomination
and confirmation only for those officers specifically mentioned 48 and
Cabinet level officials. 49 All others are inferior officers for purposes
of the Constitution. The United States Supreme Court so held in
5 0 It is therefore
United States v. Germaine.
apparent that past interpretations of the appointments clause support the contention that an
independent counsel is an inferior officer.
Like other powers expressly given by the Constitution, the power
of Congress to vest the appointment of inferior officers in other
branches is broad. As the Supreme Court decided in Ex Parte
Siebold,5 unless it is somehow incongruous to vest the appointment
of an inferior officer in some particular department, Congress may

45.

Id. at 336-40.

46. See supra note 37 for the text of the appointments clause.
47. 169 U.S. at 343-44.
48. See supra note 37 for the text of the appointments clause.
49. On this point, see Simon, supra note 18, at 60; Memorandum of Common
Cause as Amicus Curiaein Support of the Constitutionality of the Special Prosecutor
Law, Kraft v. Gallinghouse, Civ. A. No. 80-2952 (D.D.C. filed Nov. 19, 1980),
reprinted in, Special Prosecutor Provisions of Ethics in Government Act of 1978:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of Government Management of the
Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 319, 328-31 [hereinafter Common Cause brief in Kraft].
50. 99 U.S. 508 (1878). The question in the case was whether a surgeon
retained by the Commissioner of Pensions was an officer of the United States. The
Court stated that officers below those mentioned in the appointments clause were
inferior officers and that Congress could vest their appointment in the President,
the courts or department heads. Id. at 509-10.
For discussion of Germaine, see Common Cause brief in Kraft, supra note 49.
51. 100 U.S. 371 (1879). In this case, the Court upheld a law vesting the
power to appoint federal election supervisors in the circuit courts. This law was
upheld even though it permitted the courts to appoint officers to serve in another
branch of the government.
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vest the appointment power as it chooses.5 2 Unless such an appointment is incongruous, a court may appoint an independent counsel.
Given the extensive involvement of courts with prosecutors and the
conflict of interest which would result from executive branch appointment, court appointment of an independent counsel is appropriate.

IV.

THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE "GOOD CAUSE"
STANDARD

REMOVAL

When the 1982 amendments" changed the standard for removal
of an independent counsel5 4 from "extraordinary impropriety" to the
present "good cause" standard, 5 many doubts as to the constitutionality of the Act were removed.16 The removal standard became
much the same as that applicable to the heads of independent
agencies.5 7 Nonetheless, an independent counsel is not freely removable by the President,5" as are most executive branch officers. Therefore, some discussion of the constitutional implications of the removal
restrictions is in order.
Myers v. United States 9 stood for the proposition that the President
had the power to remove officers, as part of his power to execute

52. For discussion of this point, see Kramer & Smith, supra note 16, at 97679; Simon, supra note 18, at 65-67.
Today, separation of powers concerns must also be considered. See infra notes 170178 and accompanying text.
53. See 1982 Senate Report, supra note 23, at 3553.
54. The 1982 amendments to the Ethics in Government Act changed the
name of the independent investigating officer from "special prosecutor" to "independent counsel" to remove Watergate connotations and lessen adverse publicity.
Id. at 3554.
55. 28 U.S.C. § 596. Aside from good cause, an independent counsel may
be removed for "physical disability, mental incapacity or any other condition that
substantially impairs .. .performance." Id.
56. See 1982 Senate Report, supra note 23, at 3553, for discussion of how
the change in the removal standard "enhance[d] the constitutionality of the statute."
57. Id.
58. Removal is only for good cause or incapacity. 28 U.S.C. § 596(a)(1). In
addition, upon removing an independent counsel, the Attorney General must submit
a report to the special division of the court and to the House and Senate Judiciary
Committees. 28 U.S.C. § 596(a)(2). An independent counsel who is removed is
entitled to judicial review. 28 U.S.C. § 596(a)(3), as amended by the Independent
Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-191, 101 Stat.
, 56
U.S.L.W. 39, 42 (December 15, 1987).
59. 272 U.S. 52 (1926). This case overturned a statute requiring the Senate
to approve the removal of certain postmasters. Id. For discussion of the case, see
Kramer & Smith, supra note 16, at 981-83.
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the laws. 60 However, Myers applied only to officers nominated by
the President and confirmed by the Senate. 6' The effect of Myers
was diminished considerably by Humphrey's Executor v. United
States,62 in which the Supreme Court upheld the power of Congress
to restrict presidential removal of a Federal Trade Commissioner.
The Supreme Court limited absolute removal power to purely executive officers and held that such absolute power did not necessarily
apply to those exercising quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial powers.
Similarly, Wiener v. United States~3 involved the removal of a War
Claims Commissioner, a member of a quasi-judicial body. Even
though Congress had not limited presidential removal powers by
statute, the Wiener Court held that the removal power was restricted. 64
In none of these cases did the Supreme Court hold that a limitation
on the President's power to remove a purely executive officer was
constitutional. The independent counsel has none of the quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial powers of the officers discussed in Humphrey's
Executor and Wiener. However, the removal restriction should be
upheld nonetheless.
First, a strong argument can be made that the Supreme Court has
upheld removal restrictions primarily because of the need for certain
executive officials to independently carry out their duties. 65 If this
rationale is applied, the removal restrictions will definitely be upheld
in the case of the independent counsel. The purpose of this office,
created to eliminate executive branch conflicts of interest in the
investigation of executive officers, 66 would be defeated by an absolute
removal power.
In addition, an examination of INS v. Chadha67 and Bowsher v.
Synar 8 demonstrates that the distinction between purely executive
powers and quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial powers is being eliminated. In both cases, statutory provisions giving Congress a role in

60. 272 U.S. at 176.
61. Id.
62. 295 U.S. 602 (1935). For discussion of this case, see Tiefer, supra note
16, at 82-85 and Kramer & Smith, supra note 16, at 980-83.
63. 357 U.S. 349 (1958). For discussion of this case, see Tiefer, supra note
16 and Kramer & Smith, supra note 16.
64. 357 U.S. at 355.
65. See Tiefer, supra note 16, at 83-84.
66. See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text.
67.
68.

462 U.S. 919 (1983). See infra notes 83-89 and accompanying text.
106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986). See infra notes 91-95 and accompanying text.
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the exercise of legislative power delegated to the executive branch
were overturned as impermissible interferences with the executive.
The executive branch, in its exercise of delegated powers, was treated
as if it were exercising purely executive powers.
Once the distinction between executive powers and delegated powers becomes blurred, one can easily defend the application of Hum9 and Wiener70
phrey's Executor&
to purely executive officers. If officers
exercising delegated powers and those exercising executive powers are
constitutionally the same, there is no reason to allow removal res71
trictions for one category of officers and not for the other.
V.

GENERAL SEPARATION OF POWERS CONCERNS

It has been argued that the independent counsel provisions violate
the separation of powers doctrine because they interfere with the
Executive's power to execute the laws and diminish the power of the
Executive, thereby advancing the other branches. Until recently, it
was easy enough to dismiss such arguments. 72 However, given the
separation of powers doctrine enunciated in INS v. Chadha73 and
Bowsher v. Synar,74 it is necessary to reassess these concerns.
Opponents of the independent counsel provisions insist that prosecution is at the heart of executive branch powers and that the
counsel, as a prosecutor, must therefore be controlled by the President. 75 In support of this position, some would state that prosecution
constitutes execution of the laws, a power reserved to the Executive
by the Constitution.

69.

76

See supra note 62 and accompanying text.

70. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
71. Conversely, if purely executive officers and officers exercising delegated
powers are the same, there is no reason why removal restrictions should be constitutional for the latter. The Supreme Court's treatment of the removal restrictions

for the independent counsel could, therefore, have implications for officers exercising
delegated powers.
72. For instance, the Common Cause brief in Kraft, supra note 49, at 34243, defended the Ethics in Government Act on the grounds of common sense and
because one branch was not usurping the whole power of another.
73. See supra note 67.
74. See supra note 68.
75. See plaintiff's brief in Kraft, supra note 38, at 303-04; Special Prosecutor
Provisions of Ethics in Government Act of 1978: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Oversight of Government Management of the Senate Comm. on Governmental
Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 100 (1981) (statement of Rudolph Giuliani, Associate
Attorney General).
76. See Staff Memorandum, supra note 34, at 38; see also Ledewitz, The
Uncertain Power of the President to Executive the Laws, 46 TENN. L. Rsv. 757,
777-84 (1979) [hereinafter Ledewitz].
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It is unclear whether the President's duty under the Constitution
to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed, ' " 77 involves a
grant of power or a limitation.78 This constitutional language can be
79
seen as limiting the President to carrying out congressional intent.
Even if the duty to see that the laws are executed involves a positive
grant of power to the executive branch, it is unclear what aspects of
execution of the laws are exclusively for that branch. Neither historical nor current practice supports the contention that only officers
under the control of the President may prosecute. Prosecutorial
functions have been given to independent officers in the past;80 in
fact, this is fairly common. Thus, past practice as well as necessity
can be seen as justifying the prosecutorial authority of the independent counsel.
However, there are further questions involving the separation of
powers. One must examine the separation of powers doctrine of
Chadha8 ' and Bowsher.12 If the Supreme Court interprets these two
cases as requiring presidential direction of executive branch officers,
the independent counsel provisions will not be upheld. However, it
can be argued that the independent counsel provisions are sufficiently
distinguishable from the provisions overturned in Chadha and Bowsher
to withstand a constitutional challenge in the Supreme Court.
In INS v. Chadha,83 a deportable alien challenged the one-house
veto84 of the suspension of his deportation. 5 Congress had delegated

§ 3.

77.

U.S. CONST. art. II,

78.

See Ledewitz, supra note 76, at 757-59; 1988 Sealed Case, supra note 3

(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

79. 1988 Sealed Case supra note 3, at 157-58.
80. One version of the first Judiciary Act would have allowed court appointment of United States Attorneys. See 1988 Sealed Case supra note 3, at 187 n.41.
Various cases have upheld prosecution by officers not appointed by the President
or otherwise independent of executive control. See, e.g., United States v. Solomon,
216 F. Supp. 835 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (upholding the prosecutorial authority of an
interim United States Attorney appointed by a court); ICC v. Chatsworth Cooperative Marketing Ass'n., 347 F.2d 821 (7th Cir), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 938, Reh.
denied, 382 U.S. 1000 (1965) (upholding the prosecutorial authority of an independent agency); Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 107 S. Ct.
2124 (1987)

(upholding the authority of courts to appoint special prosecutors to

prosecute contempts). As noted by Tiefer, supra note 16, at 59-60, there have been
several statutes authorizing prosecution by independent officers; these statutes have
allowed prosecution by the Comptroller General and investigations by agency inspectors general who have considerable independence.
81. See supra note 67.
82. See supra note 68.
83. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
84. The Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1254 (1982), permitted
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to the Attorney General the power to suspend the deportation of
aliens, retaining for itself the power to veto any such suspension by
6
a resolution of one house.1
The Supreme Court held this one-house veto unconstitutional as a
violation of the bicameralism and presentment clauses 7 and as an
interference with the executive branch in its execution of the laws."8
Essentially, the Supreme Court held that Congress could not control
the exercise of legislative power delegated to the executive branch
except by legislation. s9
It is evident that Chadha does not speak directly to the independent
counsel provisions. However, if the Supreme Court extends this strict
view of the separation of powers to the Ethics in Government Act,
it may well overturn the statute. The reasoning of Chadha can be
extended so that any restriction which Congress puts on the exercise
of executive power is unconstitutional. By following this line of
reasoning, one must conclude that the independence of the independent counsel, guaranteed by freedom from presidential direction
and at-will removal, 90 is an unwarranted congressional interference
with the Executive. By removing a prosecuting officer from executive
control, Congress vitiates the power of the executive branch, according to this line of reasoning.
A similarly strict view of the separation of powers was evident in
Bowsher v. Synar.91 In Bowsher, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional the automatic budget-cutting mechanism of the "GrammRudman-Hollings Act." ' 92 The Act set budget deficit ceilings which,

the Attorney General, at his or her discretion, to suspend the deportation of any
deportable alien due to hardship, if that alien was of good character and had been
in the United States for seven years. Suspensions were to be reported to Congress,
which could, by a resolution of either house, cause the suspension to be lifted
during the session when it was reported or during the following session. Id.
85. 462 U.S. at 923-29.
86. For a discussion of the history of this delegation of power, see id. at
933-34.
87. U.S. CoNsT. art I, § 7, cl. 2 and 3.
88. 462 U.S. at •945-46, 952-55.
89. Id.
90. See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
91. 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986).
92. Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, 2 U.S.C.
§ 901 et seq. (Supp. 1986). Because the automatic budget cutting mechanism in this
act was held unconstitutional, Congress has enacted a substitute automatic mechanism which gives the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, who is
removable by the President, the duties previously delegated to the Comptroller
General. See Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Reaffirmation Act of
1987, Pub. L. No. 100-119, 101 Stat. 754 (September 29, 1987).
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if unattainable by Congress, were to be implemented via an automatic
budget cutting mechanism. The directors of the President's Office of
Management and Budget and the Congressional Budget Office were
to recommend budget cuts to meet the deficit ceiling. Based on their
reports, the Comptroller General was to make budget cut recommendations to the President, who had to implement them via a
sequestration order. If Congress did not act on the deficit, this order
became a permanent budget cut. 93 The constitutional infirmity in
this automatic budget cutting process was that the Comptroller
General was removable only by Congress. For this reason, the
Comptroller was held to be a congressional officer and his participation in the budget cutting process was held to be congressional
interference in the execution of the law. 94 The Comptroller General's
role was considered to be the equivalent of a congressional veto, as
Congress could influence his actions by the threat of removal. 95
The applicability of Bowsher to the independent counsel provisions
of the Ethics in Government Act is evident. The Comptroller General
is appointed by the President but removable only by Congress or by
impeachment; 96 an independent counsel is appointed by the courts
and removable by the Attorney General under certain restrictions. It
is possible that the court will extend the rationale of Bowsher and
hold that execution of the laws by anyone not under presidential
direction is impermissible. The appointment of the independent counsel by a court and the restrictions on his or her removal may be
enough to justify a holding that the Ethics in Government Act
impermissibly interferes with the power of the Executive.
If the Supreme Court continues to follow the view of separation
of powers manifested in Chadha and Bowsher,97 it still should' not

93. 106 S. Ct. at 3184.
94. Id. at 3188-90.
95. Id. at 3189.
96. Id. at 3185, 3189. It is interesting that the Court declined to reach the
constitutionality of the removal provisions relating to the Comptroller General. Id.
at 3192-93. This may indicate that the Court did not regard removal restrictions as
an important constitutional issue in terms of congressional interference with the
Executive.
97. Both of these cases were decided by the Burger Court. In fact, former
Chief Justice Warren Burger wrote both opinions. With two new justices on the
Court, Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Anthony Kennedy, the view of separation
of powers may change. Also, the influence of a different Chief Justice should not
be discounted. However, it should be noted that Justice Scalia wrote the trial court
opinion in Bowsher, 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986) (Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp.
1374 (D.D.C. 1986)). His opinion questioned the status of independent agencies on
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invalidate the independent counsel provisions. These provisions of
the Ethics in Government Act are sufficiently distinguishable from
the statutes invalidated in Chadha and Bowsher that they should
stand regardless of the direction of the Court on separation of
powers. Chadha and Bowsher involved the direct participation either
of Congress itself or of a congressionally controlled officer in the
execution of the laws. An independent counsel is not congressionally
controlled. The only involvement which Congress ever had with an
independent counsel, aside from passing the authorizing statute, was
the receipt of reports. 98 The potential for diminution of executive
power inherent in a legislative veto or involvement of a legislative
officer in executing a law is simply not present in the independent
counsel provision. While it is true that the counsel is not under
presidential direction, neither is he or she under congressional direction.
It is true that a court appoints an independent counsel and can
terminate his or her office when all investigations and prosecutions
are complete. 99 The court also sets forth the jurisdiction of the
counsel.' ° However, the court cannot appoint an independent counsel
unless the Attorney General applies for such an appointment. 0 1 If
the Attorney General decides that an independent counsel is unnecessary, there can be no appointment; the Attorney General has the
final say in this matter. 0 2 Only the Attorney General can remove the
counsel for any reason other than the completion of his or her task. 0 3
Under the rationale of Bowsher, °4 this gives the Attorney General
control of the counsel. While the court sets forth the counsel's
jurisdiction, it can do so only after the Attorney General's investigation and application, and only in accordance with the application. 05

separation of powers grounds. Justice Kennedy wrote the appeals court's opinion
in Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (Chadha v. INS, 634 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1980)) in
which the legislative veto was held unconstitutional. It seems likely, therefore, that
the Court will continue to interpret the separation of powers strictly. This has
implications beyond the independent counsel question. The status of independent
agencies and of broad delegations of power to executive agencies could come into
question.

98. See 28 U.S.C. § 595.
99.

See 28 U.S.C. §§ 593(b), 596(b)(2).

100. See 28 U.S.C. § 593(b).
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

See 28 U.S.C. §§ 592(c), 593(b).
See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
28 U.S.C. § 596. See supra note 58 concerning judicial review of removal.
See supra notes 91-95 and accompanying text.
See 28 U.S.C. § 593 as amended by the Independent Counsel Reauthor-
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Thus, the court's power to set the counsel's jurisdiction is severely
When one looks at the independent counsel provision in
limited.
its entirety, one can find no serious infringement on the Executive's
powers. The executive branch controls appointment of the counsel
and plays the primary role in removal. The counsel is appointed only
temporarily and can act only in his or her prescribed jurisdiction.
Clearly, the Supreme Court should not hold that the independent
counsel provisions violate the separation of powers doctrine, even if
the Court continues to follow Chadha and Bowsher. While the
independent counsel provisions could be overturned under the strictest
interpretation of these precedents, the statute does not violate the
separation of powers doctrine enunciated by these cases.

VI.

TaE

RECENT CASES

In only four cases have the courts considered the constitutionality
of the independent counsel provisions. In re Sealed Case (the North
case)' °6 and In re Olson'0 7 dealt with the issue of constitutionality
only in dicta. In re Sealed Case (the 1988 case)108 did involve a direct
ruling on the constitutionality of the provisions. Although the district
court upheld the Ethics in Government Act, the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit found the Act
unconstitutional. Since the Supreme Court may find any of the four
opinions to be persuasive, this comment will discuss the opinion in
the North Sealed Case and Olson, as well as the district court and
circuit court opinions in the 1988 Sealed Case.
A.

The North Case

In re Sealed Case (the North case),' °9 decided by the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, dealt with
the constitutionality of the independent counsel provisions in a very
limited fashion. The case involved a challenge by Lieutenant Colonel

, 56 U.S.L.W. 29, 40
ization Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-191, 101 Stat.
(December 15, 1987). Section 593(b)(3) of the amended Act makes explicit what was
implicit in the unamended Act: the court has authority to set jurisdiction only within
the confines of the Attorney General's application. Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 593 (1982)
(Supp. III 1985).
106. 829 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, No. 87-869 (January 19,

1988).

107.
108.
109.

818 F.2d 34 (D.C.Cir. 1987).
1988 Sealed Case, supra note 3.
See supra note 106.
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Oliver North 10 of a contempt order of the district court. The order
was issued because of North's failure to comply with a subpoena
issued by a grand jury empaneled by Independent Counsel Lawrence
Walsh. North refused to comply because of his contention that Walsh
lacked authority due to the unconstitutionality of the Ethics in
Government Act."'
The court never addressed most of the constitutional issues. Because the Attorney General had reappointed Independent Counsel
Walsh under his own authority," 2 the court held that Walsh had the
authority to investigate, whether or not the Act was constitutional."'
This was so despite the potential effect of the Act's provisions" 4 in
insulating the counsel from removal without cause by the Attorney
General." 5
The court only addressed the constitutionality of the counsel's
appointment in terms of appointment by the Attorney General.
Finding the counsel to be an inferior officer, the court held that he
could be appointed by a department head under the appointments
clause 1 6 of the Constitution.

B.

17

The EPA/Justice Department Cases

In re Olson"8 and In re Sealed Case (the 1988 Sealed Case)"9 both
involved the following set of facts: because of concerns that Environmental Protection Agency (the "EPA") officials were misusing
funds to aid republican Senate candidates in the 1982 elections, two
subcommittees of the House of Representatives sought EPA documents on hazardous waste cleanup.120 Some documents were refused

110.
note 7.
111.

As to the source of Lieutenant Colonel North's difficulties, see supra

113.

829 F.2d at 51-54.
See 52 Fed. Reg. 7270 (March 10, 1987).
829 F.2d at 62.

114.

28 U.S.C. § 596.

112.

115. In his dissent, Judge Williams contended that the "good cause" removal
provision of the Act should be enough to make Lieutenant Colonel North's challenge
to the Act's constitutionality reviewable. Because of this provision, the officer who
investigated North considered himself independent of the executive branch; therefore,
according to Judge Williams, North's challenge was ripe. 829 F.2d at 65-69.
116. U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. See supra note 37 for the text of the
appointments clause.
117. 829 F.2d at 56-57.
118. 818 F.2d 34 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
119. See supra note 3.
120. 1988 Sealed Case, supra note 3, at 4.
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on the grounds of executive privilege and an interbranch dispute
arose. Eventually, an agreement was reached as to document production.' 2
After an investigation of the role of the Justice Department in the
EPA document dispute, the Senate Judiciary Committee asked the
Attorney General to investigate possible wrongdoing by certain officials, in accordance with the Ethics in Government Act. 122 Three
of those investigated were Theodore Olson, former Assistant Attorney
General, Office of Legal Counsel; Carol Dinkins, former Assistant
Attorney General, Lands Division (and later Deputy Attorney Gen123
eral); and Edward Schmults, former Deputy Attorney General.
The Attorney General concluded that possible wrongdoing by Mr.
Olson warranted the appointment of an independent counsel and
124
requested such appointment of the special division of the court.
However, the Attorney General found no basis for further investi25
gation of Mr. Schmults and Ms. Dinkins.
C.

In re Olson

The Olson 126 case involved a request by the independent counsel
27
for jurisdiction to investigate Mr. Schmults and Ms. Dinkins.'
Because the Attorney General denied her request for expanded jurisdiction,128 the independent counsel applied to the special division of
the court. 29 Although this request was denied because only the
Attorney General may refer matters for investigation by an independent counsel, the counsel was permitted to investigate whether
Mr. Olson conspired with Ms. Dinkins and Mr. Schmults. 30
The case did not require a decision on the constitutionality of the
Ethics in Government Act, but the court discussed this topic in
extended dictum. 'I' After discussing the history of conflicts of interest
in the executive branch, the court justified the independent counsel

121.

Id. at 4-5.

122.
123.
124.
125.

Id. at
Id.at
Id. at
Id. at

5-7.
7-8.
5-7.
8.

126.

818 F.2d 34 (D.C. Cir. 1987).

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at

37.
38.
38-39.
48.
43-46.
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provisions based on necessity. 13 2 In addition, the court found support
for the Act in the necessary and proper clause of the Constitution.'
Citing the appointments clause, 3 4 the court stated that Congress
could vest the appointment of an independent counsel in a court
because he or she was clearly an inferior officer.' 35 This conclusion
was based on the limitation of a counsel's duties to one task and of
36
the counsel's tenure to the time required to complete that task.
Because of these limitations and the Attorney General's removal
power, 3 7 the court found insufficient interference with executive
branch functions to constitute a violation of separation of powers.' 3 8
The Olson case was the first to discuss the constitutionality of the
Ethics in Government Act. The court's rationale as to the constitutionality of the Act could be significant when the question comes
before the United States Supreme Court.
D.

1988 Sealed Case-The District Court Opinion

Although the judgment was reversed, the district court opinion in
In re Sealed Case39 should be discussed as it was the first case to
deal with the constitutionality of the Act on the merits. '4 The court
followed the rationale of In re Olson 41 in determining that an
42
independent counsel could constitutionally be appointed by a court.1
However, the court also found that court appointment of a counsel
is not incongruous under the rationale of Ex parte Siebold. 14 In this
context, the lack of involvement of the appointing court in investigations and the Attorney General's role in the appointment procedure
were seen as important.'"

132.
133.

Id. at 39-42.

Id. at 43-44, citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. See supra note 37 for the text of the
appointments clause.
135. 818 F.2d at 43-44.
136. Id. at 44.
137. 28 U.S.C. § 596.
138. 818 F.2d at 44.
139. 1988 Sealed Case, supra note 3. The facts of this case were originally
sealed, but were released when the case was appealed. See 1988 Sealed Case, supra
note 3, at 4 n.2.
140. Id.
134.

141.

See supra note 126.

142.
143.
144.

See supra notes 134-38.
100 U.S. 371 (1880). See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
See supra note 3, at 4 n.2.
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The removal provision was upheld by the district court based on
the counsel's need for independence and on prior cases upholding
removal restriction. 145 The court also noted that United States v.
Nixon' 46 upheld removal restrictions relating to the Watergate special
prosecutor, which the executive branch imposed on itself. The same
case was cited as support for the independent counsel's freedom
from supervision, similar to that of the Watergate special prosecutor.
47
Oddly, the court dismissed the applicability of Buckley v. Valeo,
and INS v. Chadha14 s and Bowsher v. Synar149 in a footnote. The

court stated that, because the independent counsel provisions provided neither Congress nor the courts with an opportunity to "aggrandize [themselves] at the expense of the other [branch],"15 these
three cases could be distinguished. 5 '
Overall, the court found the independent counsel provisions of the
Ethics in Government Act to be a reasonable and constitutional
solution by Congress to the problem of conflicts of interest in the
investigation of high government officials. The role of the Act in
promoting public trust in government 5 2 weighed very heavily in the
opinion.
E.

The 1988 Sealed Case-Circuit Court Opinion

In In re Sealed Case' the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit held the Ethics in Government Act
unconstitutional. This important case produced a voluminous majority opinion which discussed every possible objection to the Act. The
lengthy and scholarly dissenting opinion ably rebutted the majority's
arguments. The Supreme Court's disposition of this case may well
fix the Court's position on the separation of powers doctrine, in
addition to determining the validity of the independent counsel
provisions.
The majority opinion first discussed the appointment of the independent counsel. The majority had two major objections to the

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id.
418
424
462
106

U.S. 683 (1973).
U.S. 1 (1976). See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
U.S. 919 (1983). See supra notes 83-89 and accompanying text.
S. Ct. 3181 (1986). See supra notes 91-96 and accompanying text.

150. See supra note 3,note 6,(quoting Buckley v.Valeo, 424 U.S. at 129).
151. See supra note 139.
152. See S. Rep. No. 170, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1,reprinted in,1978 U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News 4216.

153.

See supra note 3.
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method of appointment. The first was that the counsel was not an
inferior officer under the appointments clause and, therefore, had to
be nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate. 5 4 The
second was that, even if the independent counsel were an inferior
officer, the counsel's appointment by another branch of government
was outside the framers' intent and a usurpation of the powers of
the President. 5 5
In support of the contention that the independent counsel is not
an inferior officer, Judge Silberman first outlined those officers
considered to be superior: those mentioned in the appointments
clause,1 6 and others, such as department heads and federal judges,
who have considerable discretion.

57

Although an independent counsel does not have the level of authority of these officers, the majority considered the counsel to be
likewise a superior officer'5 8 because the counsel has no hierarchical
superior. 5 9 The counsel's limited jurisdiction and temporary appoint6
ment were not considered determinative.1 0
The court distinguished several important precedents. Although it
held the independent counsel to be an inferior officer, In re Sealed
Case (the North Case)' 6' was held not to apply because the counsel
there was originally appointed by the Attorney General. Although
originally appointed under the Government in Ethics Act, the IranContra independent counsel was held to be subordinate to the At62
torney General and, therefore, an inferior officer.
United States v. Solomon, 63 which involved court appointment of
temporary United States Attorneys, was also distinguished. The majority pointed out that, unlike an independent counsel, the temporary
United States Attorneys were not insulated from executive branch
supervision or removal.164

154. Id. at 13-35.
155. Id. at 35-65.
156. U.S. CONST. art. II, §2, cl. 2. See supra note 37 for the text of the
appointments clause.
157. 1988 Sealed Case, supra note 3, at 14-22.
158. Id. at 33-34.
159. Id. at 23-27, 30-33. However, the court does admit that some officers on
its list of superior officers, such as ambassadors, do have hierarchical superiors. Id.
at 20-22. The majority seems to contradict itself.
160. Id. at 33-34.
161. See supra notes 109-117 and accompanying text.
162. 1988 Sealed Case, supra note 3, at 25-26.
163. 216 F. Supp. 835 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
164. 1988 Sealed Case, supra note 3, at 27-28.
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Ex parte Siebold, 165 in which court appointment of election commissioners was upheld, was distinguished because these officers were
not clearly executive and because of the plenary authority of Congress
over its own elections.'6 The fact that the167commissioners had no
superiors was not considered determinative.
Lastly, United States v. Eaton168 was held to be inapplicable because
of the emergency nature of the appointment there considered. The
appointment by the consul of a vice-consul who wielded all the
powers of a superior officer, albeit temporarily, was considered
169
appropriate by the majority.
Considered together, the many distinctions made by the court in
its discussion of these cases seriously undercut the court's argument
that the independent counsel is not an inferior officer. It is hard to
avoid the conclusion that some of these cases apply to the independent
counsel.
Even if the independent counsel were considered to be an inferior
officer, this court would consider the statutory appointment mechanism to be unconstitutional on general separation of powers grounds.
The court's objections to court appointment focus on the overall
unconstitutionality of interbranch appointments 170 and its potential
71
interference with the President's power to execute the laws.'
In support of its holding that only the executive branch may
prosecute, the majority pointed to the division of power over criminal
matters in the Constitution: Congress enacts laws, the executive
branch prosecutes and the judiciary adjudicates. 172 Allowing a nonexecutive officer to take over prosecution was seen as a threat to
73
liberty. 1
More specifically, the court considered the removal of a prosecuting
official from presidential supervision to be in contravention of the
President's express power to execute the laws.174 Court appointment

165. 100 U.S. 371 (1880). See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
166. 1988 Sealed Case, supra note 3, at 29-31.
167. Id.
168. 169 U.S. 331 (1898). See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
169. 1988 Sealed Case, supra note 3, at 31-33.
170. 1988 Sealed Case, supra note 3, at 42-65.
171. Id. at 35. On the power to execute laws, see supra notes 75-80 and
accompanying text.
172. Id. at 35-42.
173. Id. at 35-37.
174. Id. at 36, 42-44.
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of an independent counsel was considered as vitiating the power of
75
the Executive.
The majority also concluded that the appointments clause does not
authorize the appointment of officers of one branch of government
177
by another branch. 7 6 Neither the legislative history of the clause

nor cases interpreting it were found to authorize interbranch appoint178

ments.

In addition to the appointment provisions, the court found the
independent counsel removal provisions of the Ethics in Government
79
Act unconstitutional. Both the "good cause" removal restriction
and the provision for judicial review of removal' 80 were found to
18
infringe too greatly on presidential control of an executive officer. '
. According to the majority's rationale, only officers who do not
make policy or who do not exercise purely executive powers 8 2 may
be insulated from at-will removal. 8 3 As an officer exercising core
executive powers, the independent counsel was held to be outside the
category of officers who may be so insulated.'14
The judicial review of removal was more objectionable to the of
the court than were the removal restrictions.1 85 The mechanism al-

175. Id. at 43. The court cited Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), discussed
supra at notes 39-43, as authority for its argument. However, Buckley involved the
removal of virtually all executive power over campaigns from the executive branch.
Moreover, Congress vested this power in itself. The independent counsel provisions
do not involve so great a diminution of executive power nor do they involve a
congressional appropriation of executive power. Id.
176. 1988 Sealed Case, supra note 3, at 44-54.
177. Id. at 48-53. The court's argument for its interpretation of the appointments clause is not convincing. Among the items offered as evidence of the framers'
intent were discussions of the propriety of Senate confirmation, a discussion of
appointment of officers by states and a discussion of appointment by a council. Id.
178. Id. at 55-58, 64-65. The court discussed Siebold, supra note 163, and
Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 107 S. Ct. 2124 (1987) (upholding
the power of courts to appoint prosecutors for contempt cases). The analysis of
both cases as involving plenary powers of other branches is not convincing.
179. See supra notes 53-71 and accompanying text.
180. See supra note 30.
181. 1988 Sealed Case, supra note 3, at 65-66.
182. But see supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text. One may ask whether
the majority appreciated the effect of Chadha and Bowsher in blurring the distinction
between purely executive and delegated powers. Id.
183. 1988 Sealed Case, supra note 3, citing Myers v. United States, supra
notes 59-61 and accompanying text, and Humphrey's Executor v. United States,
supra note 62 and accompanying text.
184. 1988 Sealed Case, supra note 3, at 67-71.
185. Id. at 76-81. This court discussed the judicial review provisions in effect
before the 1987 amendments to the Ethics in Government Act. See supra note 30.
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lowing for judicial review of the Attorney General's decision to
remove independent counsel was seen as a judicial veto of the removal
decision, as the standard of review was not deferential. Is6 Overall,
the removal provisions of the Act were held to interfere with the
President's execution of the laws by removing the independent counsel
187
from presidential control.

Concluding his main separation of powers arguments, Judge Silberman contended that the independent counsel provisions manifested
a mistrust of the President which did not fit into the constitutional
scheme.' 88 Conflicts of interest were seen as a lesser evil than the
upset of the balance of powers occasioned by the independent counsel
provisions. 18 9 According to Judge Silberman, the Executive is to be
controlled only by the impeachment mechanism provided by the
framers of the Constitution.' 90 The majority saw the independent
counsel provisions in their entirety as lessening the power of the
Executive and thereby allowing Congress to advance itself at the
other branches' expense.' 91
While the majority opinion discussed at some length the powers
given to a court by the Ethics in Government Act, that topic is
largely outside the scope of this comment. If the Supreme Court
were to decide this case based on the powers given to the court, it
would not touch on the questions involving executive power which
have been the main purpose of this comment. Essentially, the majority found that some duties given to the court by the Ethics in
Government Act were outside the "case or controversy" limitations
on the judicial power set forth in Article III of the Constitution.
The duties of appointment, setting of jurisdiction and removal were
objected to as "necessarily involv[ing] the [court] in the non-Article

186. 1988 Sealed Case, supra note 3 at 82-86. The majority has an unusual
way of looking at judicial review. Every agency action is presumptively subject to
judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1982).

Judicial review is not normally regarded as a veto of executive action.
187. 1988 Sealed Case, supra note 3 at 86-89.
188.

Id. at 92-115.

189.
190.
191.

Id.at 93-97.
Id. at 97-98.
Id. at 102-115. Oddly enough, the court cited in support of its strict view

Commodity Futures Exchange Commission v. Schor, 106 S. Ct. 3245 (1986) (This

case upheld the power of an administrative agency to hear common law claims
ordinarily reserved for Article III courts, if both parties consented.) Schor is generally

seen as supporting a less restrictive view of the separation of powers doctrine. Young
v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., see supra note 177, is also cited, and
supports a less restrictive view of the separation of powers.
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III task of supervising the day-to-day activities of an executive branch

official."

192

Thus, the majority opinion in In re Sealed Case 93 gives one a
number of different arguments for the unconstitutionality of the
independent counsel provisions. Although it is not well written, the
opinion should not be discounted. If it invalidates the Ethics in
Government Act, the Supreme Court may use some of the same
arguments on vitiation of executive power and execution of the laws
as this majority used.
In her scholarly dissenting opinion, 194 Judge Ruth Ginsburg argued
well for the constitutionality of the Ethics in Government Act. Judge
Ginsburg would uphold the Act because, rather than contravening
the separation of powers outlined in the Constitution, it preserves
the system of checks and balances by curbing executive abuses. 19
Judge Ginsburg did not find that the independent counsel provisions impermissibly allowed Congress or the judiciary to control
prosecution. Rather, she argued that the Act severely limits the
participation of these two branches and lodges most of the power
96
over independent counsel prosecution in the Attorney General.
Thus, although the independent counsel provisions do not give the
Executive a free hand in prosecution, they pass the test of Bowsher
v. Synar 97 by not giving supervision of an executive function to
another branch. 98 As noted in the dissent, the role of Congress under
these provisions is limited to requesting the appointment of a counsel
and obtaining information. This is not a supervision of prosecution.1 99
Although the special division of the court appoints the counsel,
establishes jurisdiction, and can review removal2 ° or terminate the
counsel's office as necessary, this does not constitute supervision. 20'

192. 1988 Sealed Case, supra note 3, at 118-19. Similar duties of a court were
upheld in Young, supra note 177, and United States v. Solomon, supra note 163.
The majority's statement that the court is the independent counsel's supervisor
contradicts an earlier statement that the counsel is a superior officer because he or
she has no superior, supra notes 158-159.
193. See supra note 3, at 1-138.
194. Id. at 138-195.
195. Id. at 138.
196. Id. at 140-157.
197. 106 S.Ct. 3181 (1986). See supra notes 91-96 and accompanying text.
198. 1988 Sealed Case, supra note 3, at 141-150.
199. Id. at 142-49.
200. The case involved the Act prior to the 1987 amendments. See supra note
30.
201. 1988 Sealed Case, supra note 3, at 145-155.
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The dissenting judge did not consider the Act an impermissible
intrusion into areas reserved for the Executive. First, she did not
consider the duty to execute the laws as an express grant of power;
instead she viewed this duty as a limitation. 20 2 Second, Judge Ginsburg
argued that the independent counsel provisions constituted only a
limited incursion into executive territory, permissible under the ra20 3
tionale of Commodity Futures Exchange Commission v. Schor.
Given the Attorney General's retention of much power over the
course of the prosecution, 204 and the limited authority of the special
counsel, the incursion into the Executive's realm occasioned by the
20 5
Act was seen as valid.

The dissenting judge, unlike the majority, would not describe
prosecution as a core executive function. 20 6 Only those functions
specifically mentioned in Article II of the Constitution, such as
commanding the armed forces, making treaties and granting pardons,
were seen as core functions. 20 7 Thus, the limitation of executive
control over a prosecutor was not seen as an impermissible encroachment on executive power. 20
Judge Ginsburg applied a similar encroachment analysis to the
removal limitations. Absent congressional participation in removal,
a limitation on the power to remove was not seen as too great an
encroachment where an executive officer required independence. 2°9
The dissent completely abandoned the "purely executive" versus
"quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial" test of the validity of removal
210
restrictions, which was advocated by the majority.

202. Id. at 157-58. See supra note 75-80 on the execution of the laws.
203. 106 S. Ct. 3245, see supra note 191. The judge made an interesting
argument that Schor limits Bowsher, supra notes 91-96 and accompanying text, in
allowing a limited intrusion on a branch's powers. Id. at 159-61. The judge proposed
a Schor-style test for the validity of an incursion on a branch's powers, as follows:
the extent of the removal of matters from a branch's authority; whether the removal
effects a core function; and the purposes of the legislation. Id. Judge Ginsburg saw
this intrusion as limited, as not affecting a core function, and as justified by the
purpose of the Ethics in Government Act. Id. at 161-72.
204. Id. at 162. For a discussion of the extent of the Attorney General's
powers under the independent counsel provision, see supra notes 23-26, 30.
205. 1988 Sealed Case, supra note 3, at 159.
206. Dissent, id. at 166-67. For the majority's position, see supra notes 170175 and accompanying text.
207. 1988 Sealed Case, supra note 3, at 166.
208. Id. at 166-67.
209. Id. at 173-78.
210. Id. at 176. For the majority's position, see supra notes 179-187 and
accompanying text.
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In discussing the validity of court appointment of an independent
counsel, Judge Ginsburg took a different course. Completely rejecting
the majority's arguments that the counsel is a superior officer, and
its rationale as well, 211 she counselled deference to the congressional
designation of the counsel as an inferior officer.2 12 Considering
Congress' reasons for this designation to have a sound basis, she
2 13

would allow it to stand.
Analyzing the implications of court appointment of an independent
counsel, Judge Ginsburg concluded that such an appointment was
valid. 214 Because the encroachment on executive powers which would
result would be minimal, she concluded that court appointment was
not incongruous. 215 In addition, she stated that the framers of the
Constitution had not seen this arrangement as violative of the separation of powers.2 1 6 In fact, in her opinion, appointment of an
independent counsel by an executive officer would be incongruous
because it would defeat the purpose of the Ethics in Government
Act: to eliminate conflicts of interest in the investigation and prosecution of government officials .217
Throughout her opinion, Judge Ginsburg took the position that
the separation of powers among the three branches cannot be absolute; however, the separation must be sufficient to preserve each
branch's integrity. She supported the Ethics in Government Act as
a measure which furthers the system of checks and balances and
does not advance one branch over another.21 1
In dealing with the question of whether the Ethics in Government
Act gave nonjudicial functions to a court, Judge Ginsburg rejected
the majority's position. She saw all functions of the court under the
Act as either incident to the appointment power or related to a "case
9
or controversy." 21
Thus, it is evident that the independent counsel provisions can be
reconciled with the Constitution and the separation of powers doc211. 1988 Sealed Case, supra note 3, at 178-83. For the majority's position,
see supra notes 177-178 and accompanying text.

212.

1988 Sealed Case, supra note 3, at 184-85.

213. Id.
214. Id. at 185-93.
215.

Id. at 186-87.

217.

Id. at 188.

216. Id. at 187 n.41, citing a preliminary version of the first Judiciary Act,
which would have allowed courts to appoint United States Attorneys.
218. Id. at 138-195.
219. Id. at 188-193. For the majority's position, see supra note 191-192 and
accompanying text.
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trine of Chadha220 and Bowsher.221 However, this cannot be accomplished if one takes a strict view of the current separation of powers
doctrine.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Soon the United States Supreme Court will decide whether the
Ethics in Government Act is constitutional. 222 Certainly, the Court's
decision will have an effect on future investigations of high government officials, and, therefore, on the integrity of our government.
The decision may affect the very structure of our government.
Chadha and Bowsher had implications which affected the power
of administrative agencies .223 The 1988 Sealed Case will probably
have similar implications. If the appointment and removal provisions
of the Ethics in Government Act are invalidated, the status of
independent agencies will change greatly. The independent counsel
provisions are important in themselves, but the decision on their
validity may well signal a new trend in constitutional law.
Carolyn M. Corry

220. 462 U.S. 919 (1983). See supra notes 83-89 and accompanying text.
221. 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986). See supra notes 91-96 and accompanying text.
222. See supra note 153. The oral arguments are scheduled for April 26, 1988.
223. See, e.g., Chadha, 462 U.S. at 967-1003 (White, J. dissenting); Bowsher,
106 S. Ct. at 3205-15 (White, J. dissenting).

